Matt: That's what I love about you. You get right to the point. This question will probably veer us into the philosophy of time, something I've been really interested in as of late. As George McFly said in Back to the Future when speaking to his love Lorrain, "I'm George. George McFly. I'm your density. I mean, your destiny."
Socrates: Hmm. I haven't seen that movie. In fact, I've heard lots about movies in the future. But before we talk about movies, let's talk about the future, or, as George seems to clumsily refer to, our 'destiny'.
Matt: Yea, it's really interesting once you really get to thinking about it. Destiny. Is the future fixed?
Socrates: Our people had a word for that. It's called 'fatalism'.
Matt: I guess you need a word to designate a view. What is this 'fatalism' you speak of?
Socrates: Fatalism is almost where philosophy of time started! It's disconcerting to thinking about. Is the future unavoidable?
Socrates: Before we see what goes out the window and why, let's see what the fatalists can teach us.
Matt: Sure! What do they say?
Socrates: Think about this. Do you agree that there are such things as propositions about the future?
Matt: I think that's pretty obvious. If I supposed that I uttered that 'I will be talking with the famous Socrates on Fatalism on 2015' at any time before that, then that proposition would be about the future.
Matt: Sure. That's the whole Principle of Bivalence bit.
Socrates: Yes! So, if there are propositions about the future, AND these propositions are either true or false, it follows logically that there's a set of propositions about the future, which are true.
Matt: Yea, that seems so. The subset of propositions about the future that happen to be true are true. Yes.
Socrates: Well, the Fatalists say that if this subset of propositions holds true, then the future they describe can't be avoided.
Matt: Uh, oh. My free will is feeling a bit threatened. Is there any way out?
Socrates: Not yet, Matt. Let the argument run its course before critique. What is the conclusion from our set of premises?
Matt: That the future itself, the future described by the true subset, can't be avoided! Socrates, I don't like this.
Socrates: Unfortunately, truth isn't determined by what we like; but it does provide adventurous opportunity for exploration!
Matt: Okay.
Socrates: The first thing that occurred to my mind is to wonder whether these future propositions that will end up being true at the time they occur can be true or false at all?
Matt: Wait. You mean future propositions are neither true nor false?
Socrates: Well, not yet. Don't they gain their truth value at the time they occur, which would seem to imply that only present and past propositions are true or false?
Matt: I see. So, past propositions can be true or
Socrates: That seems to be what the Fatalists might be against. So, on this view, is seems that the future is 'open'.
Matt: There's actually some philosophical theologians who agree with the gist of this to say that God doesn't know the future.
Socrates: You can see how ideas are so powerful, can't you?
Socrates: That is the inference. But can you see the implication?
Matt: Well, if Bivalence doesn't hold for future propositions, when these propositions become true or false, they gain the property of 'presently true or false'.
Socrates: Right, and once the present passes into the past, what happens to that property?
Matt: It seems that the property gives way to 'used to be' true or false when it was the present.
Socrates: So, that implies that propositions can have different 'temporal' properties determining their truth value.
Matt: Yea, that's weird. So, my eating eggs for breakfast this morning had the property of being 'presently true' while I was eating, but then after I was done, the proposition describing my eating breakfast this morning lost the property of being 'presently true', and gained the property of 'used to be' presently true.
Socrates: That does seem to follow. What else seems to follow is that propositions aren't just true or false, and that's the end of the story. It seems that propositions are true or false 'at' certain times. But this seems to presuppose a philosophy of time that makes 'tense' a property that refers to something in the real world!
Matt: 'Tense'. So, 'tense' would be a property?
Socrates: Well, remember. In this case, we would have past, present, and future tense. And all these tenses can be a part of propositions that are referring to either the past, present, or future. So, for example, to say that the dinosaurs 'used to' roam the Earth entails that 'used to' is a past tense that is part of the proposition that refers to dinosaurs once roaming the Earth - that proposition has that 'past tense'.
Matt: Yea, but you said that the 'tense' itself refers to something in the real world?
Socrates: It would seem so, according to this philosophy of time.
Matt: What in particular would it refer to in the real world?
Socrates: It would refer to, plain and simply, the past. A past, mind you, that no longer exists.
Matt: Not all philosophers of time would understand it that way, though.
Socrates: Agreed. The other option that I'm aware of is just to say that 'used to be' as a past tense can be reinterpreted to refer to 'tenseless' dates. So, instead of saying that dinosaurs 'used to' exist, I can translate that to say that dinosaurs exist in the Jurassic Age, 150,000,000 B.C. Matt: I think I follow.
Socrates: I must make haste and follow up with you tomorrow. For our next talk, let's talk about time and change.
Matt: That sounds awesome!
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