The Kalam Cosmological Argument - Part 1

I've been reading books and articles and essays on the Kalam Cosmological Argument (hereafter KCA) for years, and now I want to read through the essay called The Kalam Cosmological Argument written by William Lane Craig and James Sinclair, published in the book The Blackwell Companion to Natural Theology. It is very thorough and complicated, which is a beautiful thing. I want to try to put the essay in my own words to prove to myself that I understand it. When I do this I can be honest about the parts I do understand and the parts I do not. As far as helpful criticisms are concerned, they'll boil down to being either parts I don't understand (which is either my fault or the author's), parts I do understand along with a criticism that is fallacious, or parts I do understand with a criticism that is valid. 

Part 1 Introduction

What strikes me here is the idea that cosmological arguments are a 'family of arguments'. This is something I sometimes forget. Leibniz had his cosmological argument from contingency (hereafter AFC), but this is entirely distinct from KCA. This is important because we want to be clear on which piece of philosophical artillery we're using. AFC seeks to prove that God is the sufficient reason for a contingent universe; KCA seeks to prove that God is the cause of the universe. Craig/Sinclair (CS, hereafter) list a veritable 'who's who' of philosophy responsible for generating varying kinds of cosmological arguments. I won't get into that or the different kinds, just for brevity. 

It is important that KCA presuppose 'creation out of nothing' (CON). The first philosopher of note is John Philoponus (d. 580?). He wrote commentaries on the works of Aristotle. He was an Alexandrian. He wrote books like Against Aristotle and On the Eternity of the World against Proclus. Philoponus' main beef with Aristotle was that the latter thought the universe was eternal. Thus, the first kinds of arguments against this doctrine are philosophical: it is impossible (they argue) that there be an 'infinite temporal regress'. We'll get to why later. After Muslims took over North Africa, their theologians caught wind of this polemic and enriched it, as did the Jews. Later, Jewish/Muslim enrichments of the polemic seeped back into Christian scholasticism. The Jews took it over from Muslims in Spain, and the Jews also talked about it with the Latin west. Thus, the Jews are the progenitors of this argument for themselves and Christians. 

So, where did the term 'Kalam' come from? It's the Arabic word for 'speech'. 'Kalam' later just came to mean any argument supporting a theologically relevant position having said intellectual pedigree. Later still it morphed into demarcating a whole movement called 'Islamic Scholasticism'. The term 'mutakallim' came to mean anyone who practiced 'Kalam'. 

KCA itself then proceeded to hibernate for 7 centuries. Then, the 20th century came. Science began to start empirically verifying some startling hypotheses. It seemed as though the scientific evidence (which we'll dive into below) was supporting a beginning to space and time! There were also popping up here and there books by intellectuals using the philosophical parts of KCA (the philosophical arguments seeking to prove that an infinite temporal regress is impossible). William Lane Craig is the most famous here, but mathematician/cosmologist G.J. Whitrow and Stuart Hackett (who deserves to be better known) are also listed. 

The first formulation of KCA came from al-Ghazali, a Muslim theologian. He wrote: "Every being which begins to exist has a cause for its beginning; now the world is a being which begins; therefore, it possesses a cause for its beginning." He offered intriguing arguments for the idea that an infinite temporal regress is impossible. In other words, the idea that the past is infinite is impossible (there are different kinds of impossibilities, but I will get to that later). Another key idea: 'the Eternal' is the 'limit at which the finite past terminates' (CS). This means that this 'finite past' must 'stop at an Eternal being', and this Eternal being is what's responsible for the 'first temporal being' - this Eternal being must have 'originated' this first temporal being (al-Ghazali).  

KCA itself is this:

1. Everything that begins to exist has a cause.
2. The universe began to exist.
3. Therefore, the universe has a cause. 

CS quickly warn us that the simplicity of the argument doesn't mean it isn't very complicated. Complicated arguments don't need lots and lots of premises. Lots of premises are sufficient, but not necessary, for an argument to be complicated. The complications begin when we start to give reasons for why premise 1 and 2 are true, or give rebuttals to reasons proposed for why said premises might be false. You'll see why later. The other kind of complication comes when we start trying to conceptually analyze the concept 'cause of the universe'. 

In the next blog, we'll plunge into premise 2: the universe began to exist. Is this true? The next blog will present the first philosophical reason to prove that the universe began to exist by proving that an 'actual infinite' is impossible. 

Time and Change: Is Time absolute or relational?

• I have said more than once, that I hold space to be something purely relative, as time; an order of coexistences, as time is an order of successions.
• Third letter to Samuel Clarke, February 25, 1716

Matt: Socrates. Thanks for the brief on fatalism, tense, an open future, and philosophy of time. I know that each of these topics are unfathomable. But let's keep going on your promise to get into time and change. I do this to get a general sketch, instead of a detailed blueprint. The blueprint can come later. 

Eternity is in love with the productions of time. ~ William Blake

Matt: Socrates! I see you still haven't changed your wardrobe. How are you! It's been a while!

Socrates: A while? What do you mean by 'a while'? 

Matt: That's what I love about you. You get right to the point. This question will probably veer us into the philosophy of time, something I've been really interested in as of late. As George McFly said in Back to the Future when speaking to his love Lorrain, "I'm George. George McFly. I'm your density. I mean, your destiny."

Simulated Boxing Guide for Potential Boxers

A philosopher who is not taking part in discussions is like a boxer who never goes into the ring.

• Ludwig Wittgenstein (1981) Personal Recollections. Conversation of 1930.

I have an idea. For future blogs I want to write dialogues. There's good reasons to write in this medium. For one, it's a lot of fun! Second, it tends to interest the layman more. Third,  it has a curious knack to penetrate complicated ideas and give them life. I was initially exposed to this style by Plato, of course; but Boston College professor of philosophy Dr. Peter Kreeft made it really intoxicating. It's almost impossible not to be lured into the conversation. Where expository prose often brings to mind a boring lecture; a conversation is dynamic, and has a life of its own. So, as Kreeft often uses Socrates as the skilled questioner of the philosophers in the history of ideas, I'll do the same. But I won't always make Socrates the questioner. It just depends on whose views I'm representing.

Atheism, Nothing, and Faith: Is Matt Dillahunty being inconsistent?

In any debate, conversation, dialogue, or lecture, we've heard a billion times that it's important to define your terms. In this blog, you'll see why. But I also want to bring to your attention what I think to be an inconsistency. Atheist personality Matt Dillahunty has been making the rounds, delivering lectures, participating in many debates, contributing to his Iron Chariots website, and being the face of the weekly show The Atheist Experience. He is a great speaker, persuasive, confident, and a quick, logical thinker on his feet. Though I disagree with much of what he says, I end up agreeing with what he says back to his opponents as a rebuttal. As I've pointed out in a previous blog, Matt Dillahunty is the wake-up call to not just the Church in general, but the poison of Popular-level apologetics thinking it has any sort of sufficient grasp on the issues it clumsily talks about. 

J.P Holding's case against Luke relying on Josephus

In an online article entitled Luke and Josephus, Internet apologist J.P. Holding makes the case against Luke borrowing from or relying on Josephus. I'd like to explore this article and show what Holding's conclusions are. 

Why is this important? If this problem isn't solved,

then a good case can be made to date The Book of Acts to the late first century. This is because The Antiquity of the Jews by Josephus wasn't written until 93 or 94 A.D. according to the Wikipedia entry, which cites Biblical scholar David Noel Freedman's The Anchor Bible Dictionary. If Luke relied on this book, then we have to date Luke/Acts to these dates, and not the traditional mid-60's date. 

Eavesdropping in the Masters' Common Room: Past Miracle Reports and Probability

The question of miracles usually revolves around two main topics: whether the supernatural is even possible and (if possible) whether reports of miracles are ever more probable than natural explanations. I'd like to focus on the second. It's typical that miracles are defined as violations of natural law, or the laws of physics. The word 'violation' is supposed to stop us in our tracks. The word 'law' gives the impression of a breach. In civil law, the breach entails punishment; in natural law, the breach entails an inexplicable event for which reports of miracles are forever deemed improbable due to their being out of joint with the uniformity of nature.